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SALES-A COMPARISON OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
RICHARD COSWAY*
[Continued from 35 WASH. L. REv. 412 (1960)
Section 2-312. Warranty of Title and Against Infringement; Buy-
er's Obligation Against Infringement.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a war-
ranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful;
and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security inter-
est or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the
time of contracting has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified
only by specific language or by circumstances which give the
buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim
title himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right
or title as he or a third person may have.
(3) Unless otherwise arced a seller who is a merchant regularly
dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be
delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way
of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifi-
cations to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any
such claim which arises out of compliance with the specifica-
tions.
This section evidences two changes from existing statutory law.
First, it creates a warranty on the part of dealers in goods of the kind
sold that no right of a third person, such as a patent right, is infringed.
Reasonable minds may well differ whether under the existing statute'
such a warranty exists, the difference in interpretation involving the
words of the statute imposing a warranty that the seller "has a right
to sell the goods," which seem to encompass warranties against infringe-
ment. Indicating that such a warranty is not included, however, is the
title of the section, "Implied Warranties of Title," for clearly infringe-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 RCW 63.04.140 [UNIFORPm SALnds AcT § 13].
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ments do not involve questions of title.2 Clarification of this matter
is obviously desirable.
The second change worked by this section is a simplification in the
statement of the substance of the warranty of title, for under the pres-
ent Uniform Sales Act, three warranties are separately identified: (1)
the warranty of a right to sell; (2) the warranty that the buyer will
have quiet enjoyment of the property; and (3) the warranty that the
goods are free from encumbrance at the time of the sale.' This detailed
elaboration reflects a policy of ensuring that the buyer's cause of
action for breach of the warranty will not be barred by the running
of the statute of limitations during a time when the buyer is unaware
of the breach.' The theory is that the warranty of quiet enjoyment
cannot be breached until there is an actual interference with the buy-
er's interests, however long after the date of the sale. The statute of
limitations period for breach of that warranty thus runs from the date
of the interference, not from the date of the sale.
The Code has adopted a contrary policy, by providing a four year
limitation period starting from the date of the sale, which as applied
to the breach of the warranty of title means that the cause of action is
barred after this period even though the buyer did not know of the
defect in title and even though the interference with his possession may
come after the limitations period has run.5 An exception to this will,
presumably, be made in the case of conditional sales of chattels. The
current statute has been interpreted by the Washington court to mean
that the conditional seller is not required to have title at the time he
enters the contract, but only at the time such "title" is to pass to the
buyer.'
Adoption of the Code would seem to present an opportunity for the
court to reconsider this holding, because it may have been overly in-
2 Cassidy & Possin, Implied Warranties Against Infringement in the Sale of Goods,
27 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 673 (1959) ; Robertson, Implied Warranties of Non-Infringe-
ment, 44 MICH. L. REV. 933 (1946).
The warranty has been recognized and enforced in Washington. Lambach v. Lund-
berg, 177 Wash. 568, 33 P.2d 105 (1934) ; Vinye v. American Auto Co., 165 Wash. 161,
4 P.2d 851 (1931).
3 RCW 63.04.140 [UNIFoRM SALES ACT § 13]. Argens v. Whitcomb, 20 Wn.2d 371,
147 P2d 501 (1944) ; Baker v. Shaw, 68 Wash. 99, 122 Pac. 611 (1912).
4 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (rev. ed., 1948).
5 If the buyer actually knows of the defect of title, there is no warranty against this
defect, by the express wording of subsection (1) (b) of the presently discussed section
of the Code. This does not change existing law. Spokane Sec. Fin. Co. v. Titus, 170
Wash. 508, 16 P.2d 1053 (1932).
This is only one way of evidencing that there actually has been a failure of the title,
a matter which must be shown before any liability on the part of the vendor exists.
See Hellar v. Nat'l City Co., 171 Wash. 585, 18 P.2d 480 (1933).
6 Brown v. Vantuyl, 40 Wn.2d 364, 242 P.2d 1021 (1952).
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fluenced by the Washington concept of conditional sales, by which the
seller is virtually seen as withholding the "title" to the goods almost
as if the transaction were an executory contract to sel.7 One would
believe that a conditional buyer should be permitted, on discovery of
a defect in title during the period of his instalment payments, to de-
mand some assurance that the title will be clear at the time the last
instalment is due.8 The buyer should not be forced to continue his
payments in the face of a substantial risk that all he is purchasing is
a lawsuit.
The Code repudiates those decisions imposing a warranty of title
only in situations where the seller is in possession of the goods,' thus
obviating the need to resort to the fiction of "constructive possession"
once used in an early Washington decision."0
Subsection (2) of the section restates the present Washington case
law.11
There are two problems relating to the warranty of title which are
not expressly treated in this section of the Code, but are handled in
other sections. The first involves the requirement of "privity," which
in Washington has been held to mean that, in the case of the warranty
of title, each purchaser must look for recompense to his immediate
vendor, for the warranty does not "run with the goods." 2 Adoption
of the Code will not, as will be seen in the discussion of section 2-318,
require a modification of this rule.
But a second holding of the Washington court will be reversed by
the Code. This is the case of O'Connor v. Tesdale,"' holding that the
notice requirements of the present statute" do not apply to the breach
of warranty of title. Under the Code, reasonably timely notice to the
seller of the defect in title is required, 5 where the seller's breach is
innocent, but not where he knew of the defect in title."
7 This is evidenced by the Washington (clearly minority) rule that the risk of loss
is on the vendor, because he has title. Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233
Pac. 35 (1925). See Shattuck, Secured Transactions Under the UCC, 29 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 39 (1954).
8 The buyer is, indeed, expressly given a general right to demand and receive this
assurance by a specific provision of the Code, § 2-609, to be discussed hereinafter.
9 Official comment 1.
10 North Am. Commercial Co. v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 52 Wash. 502
100 Pac. 985 (1909).
"Lucas v. Andros, 185 Wash. 383, 55 P.2d 330 (1936); Bevan v. Muir, 53 Wash.
54, 101 Pac. 485 (1909).
12 Peregrine v. West Seattle State Bank, 120 Wash. 653, 208 Pac. 35 (1922).
13 34 Wn.2d 259, 209 P.2d 274 (1949).
"4 RCW 63.04.500 [Uxniopm SALES AcT § 49].
5 
UNOIFOM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-607.
16 Official comment 2 to the present section.
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Section 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, De-
scription, Sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that
the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee"
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but
an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation
of the goods does not create a warranty.
It is quite obvious that many, indeed most, of the litigated cases
involving express warranties turn on factual issues. These questions
of fact exist under the present statute, and will continue to exist under
the Code. The Washington cases are illustrative of the types of fac-
tual issues to be expected: (1) What, in fact, did the seller really
say?17 (2) Did the person making the alleged statement have au-
thority to bind the seller therefor?18 (3) Under what circumstances
will a retailer or wholesaler adopt warranties stated in the manufac-
turer's advertising or on the containers for the goods?19 (4) Under
the particular situation, were the words used a warranty or merely a
statement of "value," or "opinion," and the like -? 2  (5) Was the sale,
17 Bosscher v. Leenders, 49 Wn 2d 397, 301 P.2d 1080 (1956); Glaspey v. Wool
Growers Serv. Co., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929).
18 Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Brown, 37 Wn.2d 49, 221 P.2d 530 (1950);
Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Case Shingle & Lumber Co., 152 Wash. 37, 276 Pac. 892
(1929) ; Watson v. Oregon Moline Plow Co., 113 Wash. 110, 193 Pac. 222 (1920)
Singmaster v. Hall, 98 Wash. 134, 167 Pac. 136 (1917).
19 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945), noted 31 IowA L. REV.
287, 288 (1946), 20 WASH. L. REv. 235 (1945). But note the effect of UNIFORMI
COMNIERCIAL CODE § 2-314 on this point.
20 Smith v. Frontier, Inc., 53 Wn.2d 805, 337 P.2d 299 (1959) (recapped tires war-
ranted as good as new tires) ; McDonald Credit Serv., Inc., v. Church, 49 Wn 2d 400,
301 P.2d 1082 (1956) ; Miller Lumber Co. v. Holdin, 45 Wn.2d 237, 273 P.2d 786
(1954) ; Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn.2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952) ; Beers v. Martin, 30
Wn 2d 1, 190 P.2d 573 (1948) ; Getty v. Jett Ross Mines, 23 Wn.2d 45, 159 P.2d 379
(1945) ; Letres v. Wash. Co-op Chick Ass'n, 8 Wn.2d 64, 111 P.2d 594 (1941) ; Randa-
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in fact, a sale by description? 2 (6) Was the particular use of a sam-
ple such as to constitute a technical sale by sample? 2
One feature of warranty liability under the present statute that has
raised fact inquiries has been the question of whether or not the buyer
really relied upon the statements of the seller.2" The Code does not
require such reliance.2' Instead, the issue is whether or not, under the
circumstances; the seller's statements, his use of a sample, or his de-
scription become part of the basis of the bargain, and-the presumption
is that any such conduct by the seller becomes part of the contract,
"unless good reason is shown to the contrary."" As under existing
law,26 this will be determined objectively without regard to the intent
or state of mind of the seller.
Perhaps the principal contribution of this section is the clarifica-
tion of a point doubtful under the existing statute, i.e., whether the
warranties arising from description are express or implied.Y They are
classified by the Code as express, as is the warranty arising in sales
by sample, a matter of great significance where an effort is .made to
disclaim warranties. The point is illustrated by the famous old case
of Shepherd v. Kain,8 where the seller advertised a "copper fastened
tine Co. v. Smith, 172 Wash. 390, 20 P.2d 33 (1933) ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), noted 7 WAsH. L. Rav. 409 (1932) ; Taylor v. Holm,
149 Wash. 701, 272 Pac. 40 (1928) ; Carver-Shadbolt Co. v. Loch, 87 Wash. 453, 151
Pac. 787 (1915) (seller's statement that a machine would stack from 500 to $1.00
cheaper than buyer's present machine, held statement of opinion only) ; Fairbanks
Steam Shovel Co.v. Jeffery, 79 Wash. 361, 140 Pac. 394 (1914) (seller held to warrant
that a machine would be "in first class shape") ; Smith v. Bolster, 70 Wash. 1, 125
Pac. 1022 (1912) (no warranty found in seller's statement that a car was "in first
class condition" and "as good as any new car") ; Jones v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 371, 88
Pac. 577 (1907).
21 Caldwell Bros. & Co. v. Coast Coal Co., 58 Wash. 461, 108 Pac. 1075 (1910).
In this case, though some of the correspondence described the article sold as "a 400-ton
coal bunker and washer," the court held that there was no warranty that it would have
that capacity where the sale was made according to specifications.
22 Mono Serv. Co. v. Kurtz, 170 Wash. 539, 17 P.2d 29 (1932) ;'Dickinson Fire &
Pressed Brick Co. v. Crowe & Co., 63 Wash. 550, 115 Pac. 1087 (1911) ; Ankkeny v.
Young Bros., 52 Wash. 235, 100 Pac. 736 (1909). On this question, the official com-
ments 5 and 6 to the present section are helpful. -
23 On this feature, the breach of warranty cases and the fraud cases tend to blend,
and the plaintiff tends to lose his case on either theory by failure to show reliance.
Dragos v. Plese, 39 Wn.2d 521, 236 P.2d, 1037 (1951) ; Lent v. McIntosh, 29 Wn.2d 216,
186 P.2d 626 (1947) ; Webster v. Romano Eng'r Co., 178 Wash. 118, 34 P.2d 428
(1934); Clark v. Parker, 155 Wash. 624, 285 Pac. 652 (1930) ; Buerkli v. Carstens
Packing Co., 122 Wash. 458, 210 Pac. 798 (1922). The statute will have no effect on
those cases relying on fraud as the basis of the buyer's recovery.
24 Mason, Article 2: Sales, 21 MoNT. L. Rav. 4, 13 (1959).
25 Official comment 7.
26 Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Callandar, 36 Wash. 492, 79 Pac. 30 (1904).
27 Crandall Eng'r Co. v. Winslow Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 188 Wash. 1,
61 P.2d 136 (1936) ; Hartman v. Barnes Grain & Feed Co., 155 Wash. 394, 284 Pac.
754 (1930) ; Jolly v. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922) ; Springfield
Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill Co., 52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233 (1909)..
28 5 B. & Aid. 240 (1821).
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vessel" to be taken "with all faults." After the sale, the buyer dis-
covered that the vessel was not, in fact, "copper fastened" and the
issue was whether his purchase of the boat "with all faults" precluded
his remedies for failure of the boat to meet the description. In hold-
ing that the buyer might rely on a warranty, the court emphasized
that the general disclaimer, when used in connection with the descrip-
tion, was not sufficient to cut off the seller's liability. The same result
would follow under the Code, as will be seen.29 The basis under the
Code would be that the description and the qualifying phrase "with
all faults" must be consistently construed, and so construed manifest
that the faults referred to are those other than the noncompliance of
the boat with the express warranty given in the description.
Two points of relevance to the Washington law are emphasized in
the official comments to this section but not clearly spelled out in the
section itself. The first is that warranties made after the sale has been
made will be binding, because if they become the basis of the bargain
as a modification of that bargain, no consideration for the change is
necessary."0
The second point made is that the Code does not imply that war-
ranties arise only in a sales transaction. Thus the Code will leave open
for consideration such cases as Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital,1
in which the "non sale" nature of the furnishing of blood by a hos-
pital was emphasized as a basis of denial of warranty liability, and
Boyle v. King County,32 where the court refused to find a warranty
on the ground that the transaction involved in disposal of garbage to
a pig farmer was a "public service contract" and not a sale.
Section 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of
Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind. Under this Section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is
a sale.
29 Section 2-316.
30 See discussion on this point under § 2-209, and the additional case of Hartley v.
Ferguson, 50 Wash. 309, 97 Pac. 234 (1908). In that case, a subsequent warranty was
held to be enforceable only if the original contract was first rescinded and a new con-
tract made. This would not be required under the Code.
3148 Wn.2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956), noted 32 WASH. L. REv. 122 (1957).
32 46 Wn.2d 428, 282 P.2d 261 (1955).
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(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units-involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affhmations of fact made on
the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Subsection (2) is the first effort to state in detail in statutory form
precisely what is meant by merchantable,"3 but even this list is not in-
tended to be exhaustive. 4 The only specific requirement of merchant-
ability stated in the Code which is not generally recognized under the
Sales Act seems to be the sixth and final one, requiring that goods to
be merchantable must conform to the affirmations of fact or promises
on the label. Since under the present law, the issue here is whether
or not the dealer by selling affirms or makes as his own statements on
the label or container,"5 the Code substitutes an implied warranty for
an express warranty which inevitably involved factual disputes. In
Washington, similar treatment has been given warranties appearing on
the packaging and disclaimers thereof, to the effect that since the re-
tailer or wholesaler does not necessarily affirm the warranties so stated,
he likewise does not necessarily have the advantage of a disclaimer
so stated.8 The Code does not address itself to this question. It would
seem that to the extent that liability is imposed on a seller other than
the one who expressly made the representations, that liability should
be coincident to and not greater than the liability on the express war-
ranty as stated, thus giving the retailer the benefit of any disclaimer
clause.
33 VOLD, SALEs 437 (2d ed., 1959) illustrates the generality of the concept of mer-
chantability under the UNIFOn SALEs AcT.
34 Official comment 6.
35 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
.o jolly v. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922).
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While the Washington court has followed the traditional path in
defining "merchantable" as being reasonably fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which intended," the court has far more frequently handled
cases on the basis of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."
That is to say, in many consumer items the particular purpose of the
buyer (which the Washington court has stressed) is merely the in-
tention to use the product in the ordinary way, such as to drink a
Coke, wear a sweater, put tires on a car, without any indication of a
unique need on the buyer's part. This usage should not be continued
under the Code.
Under the present statute, the warranty of merchantability is im-
posed only against a dealer in sales by description.39 This require-
ment does not apply to actions based on the warranty of fitness for
37 Baum v. Murray, 23 Wn.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945) (recognizes the concept of
merchantability as applied to food, but does not spell out what this means) ; Dalton v.
Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wn.2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951) ; Lockit Cap Co. v.
Globe Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290 Pac. 813 (1930) (goods need be only of ordinary
quality) ; Hoyt v. Hainsworth Motor Co., 112 Wash. 440, 192 Pac. 918 (1920) (refers
to the warranty as being that the goods will be "of fair average quality of goodness
according to its kind") ; Kelly v. Lum, 75 Wash. 135, 134 Pac. 819 (1913).
Obviously, the seller is not held to be a guarantor that there will be no defects of
any sort in what is sold, only that the goods sold are acceptable as the goods contracted
for. In the case of the sale of second-hand equipment, implied warranties will either be
nonexistent or at least minimal. Warren v. W. W. Sheane Auto Co., 118 Wash. 213,
203 Pac. 372 (1922) ; Perine Mach. Co. v. Buck, 90 Wash. 344, 156 Pac. 20 (1916).
The amount of permissible defect or impurity will, obviously, vary from case to case.
While a latent piece of iron in logs sold, which damages the buyer's expensive saw, will
not be a basis for imposing liability on the seller of those logs. Ketchum v. Stetson &
Post Mill Co., 33 Wash. 92, 73 Pac. 1127 (1903). A relatively small impurity in food
will impose liability on the seller. La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wn.2d 645,
314 P.2d 421 (1957) ; Lundquist v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 42 Wn.2d 170, 254 P.2d 488
(1953) ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wn.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945) ; Geisness v. Scow Bay
Packing Co., 16 Wn.2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942) ; Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 93
Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916) ; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633
(1913). The entire transaction must be considered to determine what quality of goods
was actually being sold; for example, the price paid is relevant on this issue. Libke v.
Craig, 35 Wn.2d 870, 216 P.2d 189 (1950). There is an occasional effort to generalize
a rule for warranty liability, suggesting that a seller, other than the grower or manu-
facturer, does not warrant against "latent" defects. Puratich v. Pacific Marine Supply
Co., 184 Wash. 531, 51 P.2d 1080 (1935). The later cases reject this.
38 E.g., Smith v. Frontier, 53 Wn.2d 805, 337 P.2d 299 (1959) (seller of auto tires
held to know that purchaser would put them on a car) ; Martin v. J. C. Penney Co.,
50 Wn.2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957) (sweater to be worn) ; Williams v. S. H. Kress
Co., 48 Wn.2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955) (purchaser of mouth wash at ten cent store
didn't tell the clerk how she intended to use it) ; Ringstad v. I. Magnin Co., 39 Wn.2d
923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952) (cocktail robe to be worn even in the kitchen). Libke v.
Craig, 35 Wn.2d 870, 216 P.2d 189 (1950), demonstrates the close relationship
between general purpose (merchantability) and specific purpose, because the hay
sold by the grower was held not to be merchantable; at the same time, the court con-
cludes that the seller must have known because of the amount purchased that the buyer
was reselling to stable, thus imposing a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Puratich v. Pacific Marine Supply Co., 184 Wash. 531, 51 P.2d 1080 (1935) (fishnet
sold was treated under the fitness for a particular purpose warranty, even though it
was used for fishing).
39 RCW 63.04.160(2) [UNIFORM SALEs ACT, § 15].
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use, and it is probably for this reason that the Washington court has
handled cases as fitness for purpose rather than general merchanta-
bility. ° It is quite difficult, for example, to determine how a retailer
of dresses can be held responsible under the present statutory war-
ranty of merchantability to a purchaser who selects the particular
dress from the racks, tries it on without assistance, takes it to a clerk
who wraps it and bills her; but it is not difficult to see that there
should be liability to her in the event the dress is made of an unu-
sually flammable material. Under the Code, such liability can be based
based on the warranty of merchantability [and not the warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose], because the Code does not limit the
warranty of merchantability to sales by description, thus removing the
premise underlying one portion of the decision in Williams v. S. H.
Kress & Co.' which held that absent a sale by description, no war-
ranty of merchantability is imposed. Under the Code, it would seem
that the retailer of products such as the mouth wash involved, is held
to a warranty of merchantability._
However, it is quite clear that the mere existence of that warranty
does not establish liability on the seller for any and all consequences,
for under the Code, as under present law, the burden is on the con-
sumer to prove that the warranty was breached and that his injuries
proximately resulted therefrom.42"
40 This is difficult to demonstrate except in a negative way. In those cases where
warranty liability was imposed on the seller for latent defects, it was based on the
warranty for a specific use. For example, Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn.2d 923,
239 P.2d 848 (1952). But in cases where warranty obligations were not found, the
court has stressed the statute's requirement of a sale by description. McCormick v.
Hoyt, 53 Wn2d 338, 333 P.2d 639 (1959) ; Williams v. S. H. Kress Co., 48 Wn.2d 88,
291 P.2d 662 (1955). For a short, but helpful, discussion of this in the law of other
states, see Note, Sale of Specific Goods-Is There an I nplied Warranty of Merchant-
able Quality? 20 AL13AY L. REv. 205 (1956).
4148 Wn.2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955). Though the warranty of quiet possession is
inherent in the general warranty of good title (White, Sale Warranties Under Wyoln-
ing Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 Wyo. L. J. 246 (1960)), the omission
of specific reference to this warranty has been subject -to criticism, such as: "It [the
Code] omits any warranty of quiet possession which is specifically provided for in
section 12(2) of the Uniform Sales Act. In view of the provision in section 2-725(2)
that 'A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,' this is a serious
deficiency in the Code. Quiet possession may not be disturbed for some time after
delivery, and section 2-725(1) sets a short statute of limitations of four years and, by
agreement, a still shorter one of 'not less than a year'." Hall, Article 2-Sales-From
Status to Contract? 1952 Wis. L. REv. 209. See also Williston, Law of Sales in the
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L. REv. 561, 478 (1950).
An interference with quiet possession will, under the Code, evidence a defect in title
(VOLD, SALEs 433 (2d ed., 1959)), and thus will be the basis for recovery unde this
warranty, if it occurs within the statutory period of limitations.
42 This has been many times demonstrated in Washington decisions: In Williams v.
S. H. Kress Co., 48 Wn.2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955), the court was impressed by the
fact that the manufacturer had produced over 60,000 bottles' of the mouth wash in the
year 1954 without a single complaint, and by the fact that plaintiff's bottle came from
19601
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Traditionally, the Washington court has treated food cases as in-
volving considerations different from sales of other merchandise,"
usually to two practical ends: (1) To impose liability even though
the defendant and plaintiff were not in privity,44 and (2) to overcome
some technical obstacle to the plaintiff's recovery, such as his failure
to give reasonable notice.45 The Code, unlike the Uniform Sales Act,
specifically includes the serving of food or drink as within the section
here discussed, but this does not require the court to terminate its
particular treatment of the food cases. That provision is designed to
change the rule in those states where the serving of food is viewed as
not a sale and thus not within any of the warranty liabilities of the
Sales Act. It is designed to increase the coverage of the Code; it is
not designed to have a restrictive effect.
Observe that the warranty obligation is imposed by this section of
the Code only on merchants dealing in goods of the kind sold. Thus,
excluded from warranty liability is the owner of goods who makes an
occasional isolated sale. It is of more consequence that the warranty
of merchantability is implied in the case of merchants even though
they did not manufacture or grow the item sold.4"
a wholesome batch, insofar as the evidence showed, because her particular bottle was
not shown to have been analyzed, but was traced to a batch of 5600 bottles for which
no other complaint had been made. In Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn.2d 923,
239 P.2d 848 (1952), the court emphasized that the injured plaintiff had not used her
cocktail robe in any unorthodox way. Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wn.2d 1,
132 P.2d 740 (1942), spells out in detail the problems of proof of breach of warranty
and of proximate cause. In Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wn.2d 284, 105 P.2d 76,
(1940), the plaintiff was able to show causation by evidence beyond mere speculation.
Larson v. Farmers Warehouse Co., 161 Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 753 (1931); Carstens
Packing Co. v. Swift & Co., 154 Wash. 15, 280 Pac. 351 (1929) (buyer was unable
to prove that the tallow he had purchased deteriorated because of a defect therein) ;
United States Cast Iron Co. v. Ellis, 117 Wash. 601, 201 Pac 900 (1921) ; Mianus
Motor Works v. Vollans, 94 Wash. 209, 162 Pac. 49 (1917) ; Makins Produce Co. v.
Callison, 67 Wash. 434, 121 Pac. 837 (1912). Official comment 13 is helpful on this
point.
43 The cases are listed in note 38 supra.
44 This has been so since Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633
(1913).
45 La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wn.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957). This
matter will be discussed under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607.
46 This does not differ from UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15, nor from the present wording
of that section in RCW 63.04.160, but it seems that at some time in the past, the critical
words ("whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not") were inadvertently omitted
from the Washington statutes. See the quotation of the statute in Williamson v. Irwin,
44 Wn.2d 373, 381, 267 P.2d 702 (1954).
There is a certain reluctance to impose liability on middle men, viz. wholesalers,
who neither manufacture the goods nor deal directly with the ultimate consumer.
Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945). Nothing in the Code sug-
gests that such wholesalers are not merchants within the meaning of the presently
discussed section. If they are not to be held liable, the probable basis is lack of privity
between them and the ultimate consumer. See discussion under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-318.
A receiver's sale is generally treated as one where caveat emptor obtains, so the
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Section 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select
or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods 'shall
be fit for such purpose.
There does not seem to be any distinctive effect of this section so
far as Washington law is concerned, but the generally accepted prin-
ciples are modified in two respects: First, under the present Uniform
Sales Act, the buyer can rely on the warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose only by expressly or impledly making known his pur-
pose, while under the Code that warranty exists whenever the seller
has reason to know of that purpose." Secondly those cases holding
receiver makes no implied warranties, though he may be held answerable for positive
misstatements. Fryar v. Hazelwood Holstein Farms, 97 Wash. 78, 165 Pac. 1084
(1917).
47 As a practical matter, this will not alter the existing Washington law, for more
often than not the buyer's disclosure of his purpose was implied rather than expressed.
Smith v. Frontier, Inc., 53 Wn.2d 805, 337 P.2d 299 (1959) ; Martin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 50 Wn.2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957) (here the buyer by happenchance stated the
purpose to be served by a boy's sport shirt; little imagination would be required for a
finding of an implication of that purpose); Williams v. S. H. Kress & Co., 48 Wn.2d
88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955) (unfortunately for the plaintiff, she did not disclose how she
intended to use the mouth wash) ; Frisken v. Art Strand Floor Coverings, Inc., 47
Wn.2d 587, 288 P2d 1087 (1955); Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298
(1953) (this is a legitimate use of the fitness for a particular purpose doctrine, since
the furnace was to be designed to heat the buyer's home. A "merchantable" furnace.
would not meet the requirements.) ; Lundquist v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 42 Wn.2d
170, 254 P.2d 488 (1953) (correctly concludes that negligence need not be shown in
order to establish a breach of warranty) ; Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn.2d 923,
239 P.2d 848 (1952) ; Columbia Concrete Pipe Co. v. Knowles, 36 Wn.2d 602, 219 P.2d
557 (1959) (the particular purpose doctrine was essential to this recovery) ; Libke v.
Craig, 35 Wn.2d 870, 216 P.2d 189 (1959) (this decision seems a forerunner of the
Code's provision). In Bam v. Murray, 23 .Wn.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945), the court
observes at 897, "generally when an article of food for human consumption is purchased
ither direct from the manufacturer or a retail dealer thereof, the buyer does by impli-
cation make known to the seller that the particular purpose for which the food is
required is for consumption. In arriving at this conclusion, the courts take into con-
sideration the nature of the article itself, the quantity purchased, and the evident pur-
pose for which it is manufactured, sold, and purchased." Under the Code, this language
would not be necessary to permit a customer's recovery, for the use here described is
the obvious general use of food, properly treated under the warranty of merchanta-
bility. Jones v. Mallon, 3 Wn.2d 382, 101 P.2d 332 (1940); Foss v. Golden Rule
Bakery, 184 Wash. 265, 51 P.2d 405 (1935). Webster v. L. Romano Eng'r Co., 178
Wash. 118, 34 P.2d (1934), held no warranty by dealer where the purchaser purchases
a stock grader of known and described kind. One should observe that the fact that the
seller is a dealer and not the manufacturer does not mean that there is no warranty of
fitness for use. Official comment 4. Mono Serv. Co. v. Kurtz, 170 Wash. 539, 17 P.2d
29 (1932) ; McKaskey Register Co. v. Davis, 159 Wash. 483, 293 Pac. 461 (1930) ;
Zapon Co. v. Bryant, 156 Wash. 161, 286 Pac. 282 (1930) ; Long v. Five Hundred Co.,
123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (1923) ; Greenwood v. International Harvester Co., 122
Wash. 603, 211 Pac. 727 (1922) ; T. W. Little Co. v. Fynbob, 120 Wash. 595, 207 Pac.
1064, 211 Pac. 766 (1922) (applies the warranty of fitness for. a particular purpose to
the sale of second hand machinery) ; United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry. Co. v.
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that the buyer's designation of goods by trade name ipso facto nega-
tives reliance on the seller are rejected.4" Instead, the use of the trade
name is only one factor to be considered in resolving the factual issue
of whether or not the buyer relied on the seller's skill in furnishing
goods to serve the buyer's particular purpose."
Because of the inclusion within the warranty of merchantability of
the generalized purpose of a particular item, that section of the Code
dealing with merchantability" rather than the present one should be
used where the buyer purchases for the normal use for which the
article is obviously designed. As discussed earlier, this will alter the
Washington approach to the problem."
Section 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
anty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol
or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be con-
Ellis, 117 Wash. 601, 606, 201 Pac. 900, 902 (1921) ("when the article ordered is to be
manufactured according to certain prescribed specifications, or is an article well known
and defined in current trade, the contract is complied with when an article is furnished
which is manufactured in accordance with the designated specifications, or is an article
of the standard kind known to the trade, even though the seller may know the purposes
for which it is intended to be used and if afterwards proves to be unfit or unsuitable
for the intended purpose") ; Hausken v. Hodson-Feenaughty Co., 109 Wash. 606, 187
Pac. 319 (1920) ; Perine Mach. Co. v. Buck, 90 Wash. 344, 156 Pac. 20 (1916) (the
suggestion that an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose will not be found
in the sale of secondhand equipment seems incorrect, and seems to have been rejected
in the T. W. Little Co. case supra) ; Turlock Fruit-Juice Co. v. Pacific & Puget Sound
Bottling Co., 71 Wash. 128, 127 Pac. 842 (1912) ; Blake-Rutherford Farms Co. v. Holt
Manufacturing Co., 70 Wash. 192, 126 Pac. 418 (1912) (the generalization that there
is always a warranty of fitness for the purpose for which machinery is sold seems un-
warranted, for this warranty may be negatived) ; Ketchum v. Stetson & Post Mill Co.,
33 Wash. 92, 73 Pac. 1127 (1903); Puget Sound Iron & Steel Works v. Clemmons,
32 Wash. 36, 72 Pac. 465 (1903).
48 Williams v. S. H. Kress & Co., 48 Wn.2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955) ; A. H. Andrews
& Son v. Harper, 137 Wash. 353, 242 Pac. 27 (1926).
49 Official comment 5. Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac.
1050 (1928) takes the approach used by the Code. See also Nelson Equip. Co. v. Estep,
50 Wn.2d 612, 313 P.2d 679 (1957) ; Boyle v. King County, 46 Wn.2d 428, 282 P.2d 261
(1955) ; George E. Miller Lumber Co. v. Holden, 45 Wn.2d 237, 273 P.2d 786 (1954) ;
Freeman v. Stemm Bros., Inc., 44 Wn.2d 189, 265 P.2d 1055 (1954) ; Cochran v. Mc-
Donald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) ; Puratich v. Pacific Marine Supply Co.,
184 Wash. 531, 51 P.2d 1080 (1935) ; Larson v. Farmers Warehouse Co., 161 Wash.
640, 297 Pac. 753 (1931).
50 Section 2-314.
51 See Note 38 supra and the accompanying text.
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spicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is suffi-
cient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is,. "with
all faults" or other language which in common understand-
ing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he
desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an exami-
nation ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him;
and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of
trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation
of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sec-
tions 2-718 and 2-719).
It is recognized under the Code, and under the Washington deci-
sions, that any warranty liability may be disclaimed.52 The Code sets
52 Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 155 Wash. Dec. 389, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960) ; Mc-
Donald Credit Serv., Inc., v. Church, 49 Wn.2d 400, 301 P.2d 1082 (1956). Ketel v.
Hovick, 47 Wn.2d 368, 287 P.2d 739 (1955) held, however, that the limitation of the
seller's liability was waived by his refusal to permit the buyer to return the goods,
which return was made a condition precedent to the seller's making good on the
limited liability undertaking. For a brief discussion, see Shattuck, Contracts in
Washington, 1937-1957: Part III, 34 WAsHr. L. Rxv. 467, 500 (1959). Williamson v.
Irwin, 44 Wn.2d 373, 267 P.2d 702 (1954) ; Gibson v. California Spray Chem. Corp.,
29 Wn.2d 611, 188 P.2d 316 (1948) (disclaimer valid whether or not the buyer reads
it) ; Columbia River Ice Co. v. Farris, 27 Wn2d 636, 179 P.2d 520 (1947) (the par-
ticular holding that a disclaimer of warranty made after the sale is not effective would
not obtain under Uxn'o0R COMmERCiAL Cona- § 2-209, discussed supra); Jones v.
Mallon, 3 Wn.2d 382, 101 P.2d 332 (1940); Crandall Eng'r Co. v. Winslow Marine
Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 188 Wash. 1, 61 P.2d 136 (1936) ; Puratich v. Pacific Marine
Supply Co., 184 Wash. 531, 51 P.2d 1080 (1935) (disclaimer on a tag effective);
Marks v. Kucich, 181 Wash. 73, 42 P.2d 16 (1935) ; National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-
Low Preserving Co., 170 Wash. 575, 17 P.2d 51 (1932) (provision requiring claim
within ten days not applicable to latent defects) ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash.
456, 12 P.2d 409, noted 7 WAsH. L. Rrv. 351 (1932) ; Van Vliet v. Washington Nurs-
ery Co., 167 Wash. 115, 8 P.2d 961 (1932) (See comments on the Columbia River Ice
Co. case, supra.) ; Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1932);
Weller v. Advance-Rumley Thresher Co.,_ 160 Wash. 510, 295 Pac. 482 (1931);
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out the mechanics of the disclaimer, if it is to be successful, with the
aim of protecting the buyer from overreaching. 3 In general, there are
three types of warranties, and the effect of disclaimer differs some-
what among these types:
First, the express warranty can be disclaimed, but this result can
be surely obtained only by the use of an integrated written contract
setting out the terms of the sale, which contains an express disclaimer
or which is inconsistent with a particular warranty claimed by the
buyer."' Even this may not, in Washington, insure against a claim
based on a showing of fraudulent statements dehors the contract."
Second, the implied warranties of quality (merchantability and fit-
ness for a particular purpose) may be generally disclaimed, by a sale
"as is," or under similar terms, but if a particular disclaimer is to be
Larson v. Inland Seed Co., 143 Wash. 557, 255 Pac. 919, (1927) ; Peninsula Motor Co.
v. Dagget, 126 Wash. 275, 218 Pac. 253 (1923) ; Los Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n v.
Pacific Grocery Co., 119 Wash. 293, 205 Pac. 375 (1922) (ten day limitation on notice
of defects not applicable to latent defects) ; Gwinn v. Heydon, 112 Wash. 664, 192 Pac.
914 (1920) (similar to the Ketel case supra) ; Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimori, 79 Wash.
123, 139 Pac. 866 (1914) (buyer need not read the disclaimer; it nonetheless is effec-
tive) ; Buffalo Pitts Co. v. Shriner, 41 Wash. 146, 82 Pac. 1016 (1905).
An earlier version of subsection (1), however, stated categorically that if the agree-
ment created an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative. Warranties,
Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUm. L. REV. 858, 868 (1953).
53 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)
46 (1958).
54 This, of course, results from the operation of the parol evidence rule. For discus-
sion of the Washington cases in general, see Shattuck, Contracts in Washington 1937-
1957: Part II, 34 WASH. L. REV. 345, 377 (1959). The relevant sales of goods cases
involving warranty liability are Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 177 Wash. 659, 33
P.2d 82 (1934). Though not a warranty case, the court dealt with the issue of the
effect of the parol evidence rule on unexpressed obligations of the seller. Winton
Motor Carriage Co. v. Blomberg, 84 Wash. 451, 147 Pac. 21 (1915); Eilers Music
House v. Oriental Co., 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023 (1912) ; Kleeb v. McInturff, 62
Wash. 508, 114 Pac. 184, 116 Pac. 627 (1911) ; Puget Sound Iron & Steel Works v.
Clemmons, 32 Wash. 36, 72 Pac. 465 (1903).
r5 Prior to Haagen v. Landeis, 156 Wash. Dec. 301, 352 P.2d 636 (1960), it seemed
never to have been doubted that a claim of fraud could be pressed in spite of a dis-
claimer in a written contract of any representations not contained in the writing.
Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954) ; Gronlund v. Andersson, 38
Wn.2d 60, 227 P.2d 741 (1951) ; Lent v. McIntosh, 29 Wn.2d 216, 186 P.2d 626 (1947)(rule recognized, but no fraud found) ; Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Romano Eng'r.
Corp., 188 Wash. 290, 62 P.2d 445 (1936) (here the written disclaimer covered only
warranties, and thus might easily be interpreted as not being applicable to representa-
tions, but for the fact that a seller's statements are now express warranties.) ; Pro-
ducers Grocery Co. v. Blackwell Motor Co., 123 Wash. 144, 212 Pac. 154 (1923) ; T.
W. Little Co. v. Fynboh, 120 Wash. 595, 207 Pac. 1064, 211 Pac 766 (1922) ; Schroeder
v. Hotel Commercial Co., 84 Wash. 685, 147 Pac. 417 (1915) ; Union Inv. Co. v. Rosen-
zweig, 79 Wash. 112, 139 Pac. 874 (1914).
The disturbing effect of the Haagen case is that a provision in the written contract,
"this Agreement contains the entire understanding.., and no representation ... has been
made that is not set forth herein," is held by the majority to negative any possible
reliance on any parol representation. Prior to this, the concept has been that if fraud
is shown, and this presumably required reliance, the effect of the fraud is to vitiate the
entire contract, including the disclaimer clause. See Note, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 525
(1959).
[VOL. 35
SALES AND THE U.C.C.
made, in the case of merchantability, that warranty must be expressly
identified as disclaimed.56
Third, the warranties of title which under existing law5" and prob-
ably under the Code" must be specifically disclaimed and are not ex-
cluded by a sale "as is," which term normally refers only to quality
of the goods.
Subsection (3) (b) of this section is essentially the same provision
as that stated in the present statute,55 negativing warranties against
defects which can be or ought to be discovered on inspection. The
present statute permits warranties to be negatived by custom or usage, 0
and it is to be expected that in view of the Code's definition of "usage
of the trade,"61 there will be no departure from the Washington deci-
sions requiring a showing that the claimed custom is general or of one
which the parties should know. 2
The case of Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co." merits particular notice.
In that case, a retailer was sued for his failure to supply spring rye,
where he delivered fall rye in bags which had come from his supplier
and on which appeared: "The greatest care is exercised to have all
goods true and reliable, but they are not warranted nor will any re-
sponsibility be assumed for any loss or damage for failure of crop. If
not accepted on these terms goods must be returned at once." This
disclaimer was held to have been made by, and thus to effect the lia-
bility of, the supplier, but did not amount to a disclaimer by the re-
56 Official comment 3. See Webster v. L. Romano Eng'r. Corp., 178 Wash. 118, 34
P.2d 428 (1934) ; Devereaux v. Severyns, 132 Wash. 227, 232 Pac. 363 (1925) ; H. E.
Gleason Co. v. Carman, 109 Wash. 536, 187 Pac. 329 (1920) ; Western Farquhar Mach.
Co. v. Pierce, 108 Wash. 621, 185 Pac. 570 (1919).
If a seller were to offer for sale "potatoes, as is," it is quite obvious that he will not
comply by delivering sacks of rocks. The phrase "as is" does not negative the express
warranty of description created by the use of the word "potatoes." See discussion at
notes 28 and 29 supra. Obviously, then, problem cases are to be expected testing out
how putrid a potato can be without ceasing to be a potato. See Gagnon v. Speback, 383
Pa. 359, 118 A.2d 744 (1955), 389 Pa. 17, 131 A.2d 619 (1957), noted 34 TEXAS L. Rv.
952 (1956), 1 VILL. L. REv. 360 (1956) ; Williamson v. Irwin, 44 Wn.2d 373, 267 P.2d
702 (1954).
5 See Rundle v. Capitol Chevrolet, Inc., 23 Tenn. App. 151, 129 S.W.2d 217 (1939).
5sUmFom CommRCiAL CODE, § 2-312 (2).
69 RCW 63.04.160 [UNIFORM SALEs Act § 15]
Libke v. Craig, 35 Wn.2d 870, 216 P.2d 189 (1950) ; Bleyhl v. Tea Garden Prods.
Co., 30 Wn.2d 447, 191 P.2d 851 (1948) ; Marks v. Kucich, 181 Wash. 73, 42 P.2d 16(1935) ; Gilpatrick v. Downie, 143 Wash. 671, 255 Pac. 1028 (1927) ; Singmaster v.
Hall, 98 Wash. 134, 167 Pac. 136 (1917) ; United Iron Works v. Rathskeller Co., 94
Wash. 67, 161 Pac. 1197 (1916) ; Aurora Land Co. v. Keevan, 67 Wash. 305, 121 Pac.
469 (1912).
60 RCW 63.04.720 [UNIFORM SALEs Act § 71]
6 1 UNroRm CommERciAL CODE § 1-205.
O2lFrisken v. Art Strand Floor Coverings, Inc., 47 Wn.2d 587, 288 P.2d 1087 (1955);
Seattle Flower & Bulb Co., Inc. v. E. S. Burgan & Sons, Inc., 44 Wn.2d 872, 271 P.2d
704 (1954).
65122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922).
19601
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tailer who was thus liable. The basis for the seller's liability was a
warranty that the goods sold must be true to name, presumably in-
cluded in the Code under merchantability. The Code does not seem
to address itself to this point, for it merely requires a disclaimer to
be in conspicuous writing but does not specify who must provide that
writing. Since the liability was based on implied warranty, it would
seem that the Code does not require any change in the rule announced
by this case, but of course had the liability been based on an express
warranty as contained in the label, then clearly the disclaimer is rele-
vant to determining the meaning of the whole contract.
Section 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express or
Implied.
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as con-
sistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construc-
tion is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine
which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the
following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sam-
ple or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent gen-
eral language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties
other than implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose.
In general, this section of the Code expresses the approach taken by
the Washington court.6" The use of specifications, for example, has
64 In Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (1953), an express warranty was
held not to negative the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. In Foss
v. Golden Rule Bakery, 184 Wash. 265, 266-267, 51 P.2d 405 (1935), a printed war-
ranty stated, "It is expressly understood that the only warranty relating to the sale of
said property is the standard warranty from the manufacturer to the purchaser, a copy
of which is available to the purchaser and of which he has full knowledge. There is no
dealer's warranty, expressed or implied, attending this sale." Typewritten on the con-
tract were these words: "This machine is guaranteed in workmanship and any expense
or repair will be taken care of by the Northwest Dairy Supply Co. for one year." The
court held that there is no inconsistency in these warranties, one is a warranty of fitness
for purpose; the other, a warranty of workmanship. In Greenwood v. International
Harvester Co., 122 Wash. 603, 606, 211 Pac. 727, 728 (1922), the written contract
provided that no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was given, that the only
warranty was that the machine would perform general farm purposes under average
conditions. The buyer introduced testimony that the seller's agents had represented
that the machine was specially fitted for harvesting the particular crop the buyer showed
those agents. The court uoheld the admission of this testimony on the ground that "it
was permissible to show the purposes for which the machines were designed, the writ-
ten contract not being explicit upon that subject, and to show by oral evidence what
ordinary and average conditions were and what is was contemplated that the machinery
should be capable of doing under such circumstances." In Spirit Valley Lumber Co. v.
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been effective to prevent implication of warranties which, absent speci-
fications, might have been found. For example, one seller and buyer
exchanged correspondence describing the article sold as a "400-ton coal
bunker and washer," which words used by the seller would, amount to
an express warranty that the buinker delivered would meet that descrip-
tion. The contract, however, was found to contain rather complete
specifications known to both buyer and seller and the item delivered
and installed, though not of 400-ton capacity, was in compliance with
the specifications. The holding, that there was no breach of warranty,"
is precisely that to be anticipated under the Code.:
Frequently, however, the problem is not one of interpreting various
conflicting warranties; instead, the issue is whether the failure of a
writing to state a warranty necessarily excludes evidence of previous
oral agreements. Or slightly modified, does the inclusion of a par-
ticular express warranty in a written agreement necessarily preclude
reliance on previously stated parol warranties?6" This will turn on
whether the writing is designed as the integrated agreement of the
parties."T If the writing is construed to be the embodiment of the
entire contract between the parties, evidence of additional express
undertakings prior to or contemporaneous therewith would be inad-
missible; contrarywise if the writing is not construed as a complete
integration. 8 The writing will not preclude enforcement of implied
warranties, except insofar as the warranty claimed is inconsistent with
or disclaimed by the writing. 9
Section 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express
or Implied.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
A. H. Averill Mach. Co., 49 Wash. 46, 94 Pac. 650 (1908), the-court found that cer-
tain express provisions were inconsistent with a claimed implied warranty.
65 Caldwell Bros. & Co. v. Coast Coal Co., 58 Wash. 461, 108 Pac. 1075 (1910).
66 In Pacific Aviation Co. v. Philbrick, 67 Wash. 414, 419, 121 Pac. 864, 865 (1912),
the buyer sought to rely on parol representations about the airplane sold, contending
they were false. The court said: "Touching the question of a parol warranty, it suf-
fices to say that the bill of sale to Waldron warrants title only. The instrument is
complete in itself, and -evidence of a prior or contemporaneous parol warranty was
inadmissible."6 7 UNnpORu COmERCuL CODE § 2-202.
6 One may question whether the bill of sale relied on by the court in the Philbrick
case supra note 66 is necessarily an integration of the contract. In general, see Shat-
tuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957: Part I, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 345, 380 (1959).
69 See discussion of UNFORm COMMERCML CODE § 2-316.
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is injured in person by breach of warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
The liability of the seller of goods to members of the purchaser's
household has been tacitly recognized in this state," so the statute
will not enlarge the seller's responsibility in that respect. Somewhat
more serious, however, is the possibility that the silence of the statute
on other aspects of the privity problem may tend to have a retrogres-
sive effect on some of the Washington views on the privity rule. It
must be made as plain as possible that the writers of the Code did not
mean to suggest that this limited inroad into the requirement of privity
tacitly approves the other aspects of the privity rule. For example, the
Code takes no position respecting the warranty obligations of the manu-
facturer or wholesaler to the ultimate consumer.' Those issues are to
be resolved on the basis of the common law.
One cannot fail to discern that in the Washington decisions which
have pioneered the extension of the liability of manufacturers to per-
sons not in privity with them, there has been a reluctance to adopt a
forthright rule that warranty liability, being a mixture of tort and con-
tract does not require privity." To the contrary, the concept has been
70 For example, in LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wn.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421
91957), a case involving a foreign substance in a soft drink, the discussion centers on
e liability of the manufacturer to the consumer, without particular attention to the
fact that the person injured was the wife of the purchaser. In Martin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 50 Wn.2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957), the person injured by a burning shirt was
the son of the purchaser. In Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn.2d 923, 239 P.2d 848
(1952), the injured user of a flammable robe was the wife of the purchaser, a factor
not discussed.
In Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wn.2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943) a passenger
in a car was held to have stated a cause of action against the seller of that car, who
had reconditioned it and sold it as a used car. The recovery seems to lie in the field of
negligence, however, though the court does mention representations and warran-
ties made by the seller. One may speculate whether the Code's provision extending the
seller's warranty liability to guests in the home may not reasonably extend to guests
in a car. In Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927) the
operator of a garage, not a seller of the car, was held not to be liable to passengers in
a car on which he had done repair work in a manner claimed to have been improper.
In Fuhrman v. Interior Warehouse Co., 64 Wash. 159, 116 Pac. 666 (1911) one who
sold to a tenant under a cropping contract was held answerable to the landlord when
he delivered wheat different from that described, on the theory that the landlord and
tenant were tenants in common. One may speculate whether a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship will be treated similarly to the host-guest relationship specifically covered by
the Code.
73 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE),
45 (1958).
72 In Fines v. West Side Implement Co., 156 Wash. Dec. 317, 324, 352 P.2d 1018,
1022 (1960), the court said: "We have indicated that the time is coming, and now is
(at least under certain circumstances), when manufacturers are to be held responsible
to those damaged by reliance on their false and misleading advertising, even though
there be no privity of contract."
Perhaps the nearest the Washington Supreme Court has come to this approach in
the case of express warranties is the now classic decision in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) noted in 7 WASH. L. REV. 351 (1932), and in the
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that privity is required for warranty liability under the Uniform Sales
Act, but in a given case there may be a basis for the manufacturer's
liability above and beyond statutory warranty. This is especially true
of the food cases.7" Attention has been directed before to the fact that
the Code encompasses within its rules the liability of one who serves
food or drink, a matter on which the Sales Act decisions have varied.74
The impact of this section will not be great insofar as what the Code
actually says, but the fact that the Code treats this liability as war-
ranty of merchantability liability may indicate that the liability of
food manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers is likewise warranty lia-
bility. This would take away the shelter which permits the Washington
court to impose liability on remote suppliers of food and "dangerous
instrumentalities" without abolishing the privity requirement of war-
ranty. Three possibilities thus exist: (1) The least desirable and least
likely is that the court will treat this liability of remote food suppliers
as statutory warranty and only that, and depart from the long estab-
lished recognition of their liability in this state. 5 (2) The court may
decide that even if the food dealer's liability is warranty liability, still
privity is not required. (3) The liability based on the public policy of
imposing responsibility to proyide pure food on anyone who engages
in the food business is recognized, quite apart and in addition to any
warranty of merchantability. If the second approach is taken, the court
will be hard put to find ways of distinguishing some kinds of warranty
liability (food and dangerous instrumentality) from others," so it is
case of implied warranties is the pioneering decision in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75
Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
7sLaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wn.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957) ; Geisness
v. Scow Bay Pack. Co., 16 Wn.2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942) ; Nelson v. West Coast Dairy
Co., 5 Wn.2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940) ; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., supra note 72.
Privity is said not to be required where the goods sold are "noxious or dangerous,"
or where fraud and deceit can be shown. Edwards, Privity: Property Damage; and
Personal Injuries-A Re-appraisal, 32 WAsHi. L. Rtv. 153 (1957). In addition to these
cases, liability for breach of warranty has occasionally been imposed on a remote party
by use of fictions, particularly by a finding that the purchaser from the manufacturer
was the agent of the plaintiff in making the purchase. Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wn.2d
760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955) ; Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
See Gillam, Judicial Legislation, Legal Fictions and Products Liability: the Agency
Theory, 37 ORE. L. REv. 217 (1958).
74 UNIFORM CommERciAL CoDE § 2-314.
75 Somewhat the same problem is posed by the restrictive language of the present
UNIroR SALES Aar, in that inferentially at least, warranty liability is imposed on
sellers in favor of buyers. This has not precluded a finding of liability of a supplier of
unwholesome food other than the person who dealt with the consumer. See Edwards,
supra note 73; Fisher, Implied Warranties of Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract Hole,
11 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 262 (1956).
76 As for example, trying to decide whether dog food is "food" within the meaning )
of the rule, as in McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D., Cal., 1954) ; Note, 34
TEXAs L. REv. 954 (1956), or trying to distinguish food cases from cases involving cos-
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most likely that the Code will not affect the liability of any remote
supplier who, for reasons of assumed policy, ought to bear the risks of
defective food or of any commodity dangerous to life or health."
Section 2-319. F.O.B. and F.A.S. Terms.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means "free
on board") at a named place, even though used only in con-
tion with the stated price, is a delivery term under which
(a) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the seller
must at that place ship the goods in the manner provided
in this Article (Section 2-504) and bear the expense and risk
of putting them into the possession of the carrier; or
(b) when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the seller
must at his own expense and risk transport the goods to
that place and there tender delivery of them in the manner
provided in this Article (Section 2-503);
(c) when under either (a) or (b) the term is also F.O.B. vessel,
car or other vehicle, the seller must in addition at his own
expense and risk load the goods on board. If the term is
F.O.B. vessel the buyer must name the vessel and in an ap-
propriate case the seller must comply with the provisions
of this Article on the form of bill of lading (Section 2-323).
(2) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.A.S. (which means "free
alongside") at a named port, even though used only in connec-
tion with the stated price, is a delivery term under which the
seller must
(a) at his own expense and risk deliver the goods alongside the
vessel in the manner usual in that port or on a dock desig-
nated and provided by the buyer; and
(b) obtain and tender a receipt for the goods in exchange for
which the carrier is under a duty to issue a bill of lading.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed in any case falling within subsection
(1)(a) or (c) or subsection (2) the buyer must seasonably give
any needed instructions for making delivery, including when
the term is F.A.S. or F.O.B. the loading berth of the vessel and
in an appropriate case its name and sailing date. The seller
may treat the failure of needed instructions as a failure of co-
metics and other products obviously intended for use on the body. See Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E.2d 612 (1958).
77 For a learned discussion of the privity rule, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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operation under this Article (Section 2-311). He may also at
his option move the goods in any reasonable manner prepara-
tory to delivery or shipment.
(4) Under the term F.O.B. vessel or F.A.S. unless otherwise agreed
the buyer must make payment against tender of the required
documents and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand
delivery of the goods in substitution for the documents.
There will, of course, be cases where the use of F.O.B. and F.A.S.
will be significant as a price term, for example in determining prices
permissible under price fixing statutes." But most important the use
of these terms is of significance on two basic issues: (a) what must the
seller do to perform the contract, and (b) where is the risk of loss.
The present Code section section governs these issues, irrespective of
whether the term "F.O.B." or "F.A.S." appears only in the price terms
of the contract. This will clarify existing Washington case law."0
Insofar as risk of loss is concerned, the statute does not alter present
statements of the law," except that the issue is no longer couched in
terms of who has title as is the case under some of the Washington de-
cisions."1 The seller's obligations vis-A.-vis delivery will not be
changed."2
The critical words in these subsections are "unless otherwise agreed."
One can illustrate the significance of these words by reference to the
written contract used in Phoenix Packing Co. v. Humphrey-Ball Co.,"8
wherein a Seattle buyer wrote to a San Francisco seller: "We have this
day bought from [seller] of San Francisco... to be shipped first half
of November or as soon thereafter as goods can be packed, the follow-
ing .. .. These prices are f.o.b. California, Fresno, less 1Y2 per cent
cash discount. Terms-Cash with documents attached. When buyer
requests the privilege of examination before payment of draft, routing
78 Goerig v. Elliott, 27 Wn.2d 600, 179 P.2d 320 (1947).
79 In Valley Fruit Co. v. United- States Fid. & Guar. Co., 161 Wash. 166, 296 Pac.
557 (1931) the price term "f.o.b. Walla Walla" was held to determine the place of
delivery, but in Mutual Sales Agency, Inc. v. Hori, 145 Wash. 236, 259 Pac. 712
(1927) the court disregarded an f.o.b. phrase as determinative only of the price. The
Code, of course, takes the view of the later decision.80 Croton Chem. Corp. v. Birkenwald, Inc., 50 Wn2d 684, 314 P.2d 622 (1957).
81 See UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-401.
82 Gillarde v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 28 Wn.2d 233, 179 P.2d 235 (1947) (If
the contract calls for delivery f.o.b. seller's place, the seller must exercise due care in
loading else he will bear the risk of loss.) ; Rawleigh Co. v. Harper, 173 Wash. 233,
22 P.2d 665 (1933) (The seller was not doing business within the state of Washington
by selling f.o.b. a place in California) ; Valley Fruit Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., subra note 78; Skinner v. Griffiths & Sons, 80 Wash.291,141 Pac. 693 (1914) ;
R. J. Menz Lumber Co. v. E. J. McNeeley & Co., 58 Wash. 223, 108 Pac. 621 (1910).
83 58 Wash. 396, 108 Pac. 952 (1910).
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to rest with seller. Such examination to be made within three days of
the arrival of the goods, otherwise buyer waives all rights of rejection
or claim as to quality."
The issue involved, in the court's analysis, was whether the seller
can maintain an action for an admitted breach by buyer and recover
damages, without evidence as to those damages in Washington. The
critical provision of the contract was that giving the buyer a right to
inspect, in Seattle, which in effect overrode the effect of the provision
for prices "f.o.b. California," and for payment against documents.
Thus "title had not passed" until inspection, and evidence as to the
market value in Fresno is not relevant.
Under the Code, however, by which "f.o.b. California" even in the
price term is treated as a delivery term, a contrary result would be
anticipated, turning on the effect of the provision for inspection. It
is quite clear that the Code's provisions giving the buyer the right to
inspect" affect only his obligation to pay, and do not condition the
passage of "title".8"
Section 2-320. C.I.F. and C. & F. Terms.
(1) The term C.I.F. means that the price includes in a lump sum
the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to the
named destination. The term C. & F. or C.F. means that the
price so includes cost and freight to the named destination.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed and even though used only in connec-
tion with the stated price and destination, the term C.I.F. des-
tination or its equivalent requires the seller at his own expense
and risk to
(a) put the goods into the possession of a carrier at the port
for shipment and obtain a negotiable bill or bills of lading
covering the entire transportation to the named destina-
tion; and
(b) load the goods and obtain a receipt from the carrier (which
may be contained in the bill of lading) showing that the
freight has been paid or provided for; and
(c) obtain a policy or certificate of insurance, including any
war risk insurance, of a kind and on terms then current at
the port of shipment in the usual amount, in the currency
of the contract, shown to cover the same goods covered by
the bill of lading and providing for payment of loss to the
84 UNIFORM CO0M1MERCIAL CODE § 2-613.
85 Official comment to § 2-613.
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order of the buyer or for the account of whom it may con-
cern; but the seller may add to the price the amount of the
premium for any such war risk insurance; and
(d) prepare an invoice of the goods and procure any other doc-
uments required to effect shipment or to comply with the
contract; and I
(e) forward and tender with commercial promptness all the
documents in due form and with any indorsement neces-
sary to perfect the buyer's rights.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term C. & F. or its equivalent has
the same effect and imposes upon the seller the same obliga-
tions and risks as a C.I.F. term except the obligation as to
insurance.
(4) Under the term C.I.F. or C. & F. unless otherwise agreed the
buyer must make payment against tender of the required docu-
ments and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand
delivery of the goods in substitution for the documents.
This section is without statutory precedent and is an effort to state
the understanding of commercial men as to 'the meaning of certain
standardized terms. Except for on early decision,"6 later discredited,"7
the Code reflects the Washington case law.8" Particularly noteworthy
is the decision in Anderson, Meyer & Co. v. Northwest Trading Co.,"9
where the court dealt with a transaction involving both rail and ship
transportation, raising the issue of whether timely shipment by rail
under a C.I.F. contract was performance, in spite of the fact that de-
livery to the buyer was actually substantially delayed because of the
war's effect on ship transportation out of San Francisco. The decision,
that shipment by rail and tender of bill of lading for trans-Pacific ex-
port met the seller's requirement, is accepted by the Code. A coun-
seling point is that the present section of the Code, and the next
preceding and five following sections spell out in detail the conse-
quences to follow from use of these terms. By choosing with care the
precise term and its modifiers, (i.e. if F.O.B. is used, indicate also
86 Collignon & Co. v. Hammond Milling Co., 68 Wash. 626, 123 Pac. 1083 (1912).
"C.I.F." does not "determine as between buyer and seller when or where the title to
the goods passes.... That depends upon the intention of the parties to be determined
as in other cases."
87 Northern Grain Warehouse Co. v. Northwest Trading Co., 117 Wash. 422, 201
Pac. 903, 204 Pac. 202 (1921) ; Anderson, Meyer & Co. v. Northwest Trading Co.,
115 Wash. 37, 196 Pac. 630 (1921).
88 Cases cited in preceding note. No case has been found dealing with the "C. & F."
term.
89 115 Wash. 37, 196 Pac. 630 (1921).
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whether (a) the seller's place of business, (b) the buyer's place of
business, (c) a vessel, or (d) a railroad car is intended) the obligations
of the seller can be stated with simplicity yet precision."
Section 2-321. C.I.F. or C. & F.: "Net Landed Weights"; "Pay-
ment on Arrival"; Warranty of Condition on Arrival.
Under a contract containing a term C.I.F. or C. & F.
(1) Where the price is based on or is to be adjusted according to
"net landed weights," "delivered weights," "out turn" quantity
or quality or the like, unless otherwise agreed the seller must
reasonably estimate the price. The payment due on tender of
the documents called for by the contract is the amount so esti-
mated, but after final adjustment of the price a settlement
must be made with commercial promptness.
(2) An agreement described in subsection (1) or any warranty of
quality or condition of the goods on arrival places upon the
seller the risk of ordinary deterioration, shrinkage and the like
in transportation but has no effect on the place or time of iden-
tification to the contract for sale or delivery or on the passing
of the risk of loss.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed where the contract provides for pay-
ment on or after arrival of the goods the seller must before
payment allow such preliminary inspection as is feasible; but
if the goods are lost delivery of the documents and payment
are due when the goods should have arrived.
While use of the term "C.I.F." passes the risk of loss during transit
to the buyer, this section makes it quite plain that reference is had to
the risk of loss incident to shipment. The seller and buyer may agree,
even under a contract of this sort, that other risks, such as deterior-
ation, are to be borne by the seller. In Kock Produce Co. v. Rob-
ertson," the contract called for "first grade New Zealand creamery
butter," to be shipped "C.I.F.E."'" with "Government certificate
attached to bill of lading. Butter to be paid for in full as soon as
cleared by U. S. Government inspection against preservatives." The
suit was one by the buyer who claimed that the contract visualized that
the butter would be first class in Seattle, which it was not. As would
be true under the Code, the court reasoned that the contract plainly
90 See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE) 63 (1958).
9190 Wash. 260, 155 Pac. 1044 (1916).
92 "Cost, Insurance, Freight, Exchange."
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placed the risks of deterioration on the buyer, by providing for a Gov-
ernment certificate to be attached to the bill of lading, which must
require a certificate from the New Zealand government, thus placing
deterioration risks on the buyer. The actual holding was, however,
that the seller's subsequent acquiesence in the buyer's claim and agree-
ing on new terms shifted this loss back to him."
The provision of the contract requiring payment in full "as soon as
cleared by the U. S. Government inspection against preservatives,"
was not adverted to. Under subsection (3), this clause would defer
the buyer's obligation to pay until such inspection, but would not shift
to the seller the risk of loss in transit, for if the goods did not arrive,
the Code would have required the buyer to pay "when the goods should
have arrived."
Section 2-322. Delivery 'Ex-Ship."
(1) Unless otherwise agreed a term for delivery of goods "ex-ship"
(which means from the carrying vessel) or in equivalent lan-
guage is not restricted to a particular ship and requires de-
livery from a ship which has reached a place at the named
port of destination where goods of the kind are usually dis-
charged.
(2) Under such a term unless otherwise agreed
(a) the seller must discharge all liens arising out of the car-
riage and furnish the buyer with a direction which puts the
carrier under a duty to deliver the goods; and
(b) the risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until the goods
leave the ship's tackle or are otherwise properly unloaded.
No Washington authority has been found dealing with the use of this
term.
Section 2-323. Form of Bill of Lading Required in Overseas
Shipment; "Overseas."
(1) Where the contract contemplates overseas shipment and con-
tains a term C.I.F. or C. & F. or F.O.B. vessel, the seller unless
otherwise agreed must obtain a negotiable bill of lading stating
93 The allocation of risks is within the power of the contracting parties, thus posing
the need for skillful draftsmanship. In any case, problems of construction of the con-
tract may arise. For example, in Pacific Commercial Co. v Northwestern Fisheries
Co., 115 Wash. 608, 197 Pac. 930 (1921), tanned salmon was cofitracted for to be
shipped by steamer at the buyer's risk, except for "swells, blows and puffs," not di-
rectly traceable to exceptional conditions in transit. The goods were shipped aboard
a sailing vessel, which delayed arrival as much as six months. The jury found that
the harm to the cans was not the result of the buyer's directing shipment aboard a
sailing vessel rather than a steamer, thus the risks were the seller's.
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that the goods have been loaded on board or, in the case of a
term C.I.F. or C. & F., received for shipment.
(2) Where in a case within subsection (1) a bill of lading has been
issued in a set of parts, unless otherwise agreed if the docu-
ments are not to be sent from abroad the buyer may demand
tender of the full set; otherwise only one part of the bill of
lading need be tendered. Even if the agreement expressly re-
quires a full set
(a) due tender of a single part is acceptable within the provi-
sions of this Article on cure of improper delivery (subsec-
tion (1) of Section 2-508); and
(b) even though the full set is demanded, if the documents are
sent from abroad the person tendering an incomplete set
may nevertheless require payment upon furnishing an in-
demnity which the buyer in good faith deems adequate.
(3) A shipment by water or by air or a contract contemplating such
shipment is "overseas" insofar as by usage of trade or agree-
ment it is subject to the commercial, financing or shipping prac-
tices characteristic of international deep water commerce.
No Washington case has been found dealing with this aspect of the
law of sales, and this section is without statutory precedent.
Section 2-324. "No Arrival, No Sale" Term.
Under a term "no arrival, no sale" or terms of like meaning, un-
less otherwise agreed,
(a) the seller must properly ship conforming goods and if they
arrive by any means he must tender them on arrival but he
assumes no obligation that the goods will arrive unless he
has caused the non-arrival; and
(b) where without fault of the seller the goods are in part lost
or have so deteriorated as no longer to conform to the con-
tract or arrive after the contract time, the buyer may pro-
ceed as if there had been casualty to identified goods (Sec-
tion 2-613).
To further the policy of permitting the parties to allocate the risks
incident to the sales transaction, this section permits the seller and
buyer to agree that, though the risk during transit is on the seller, he
will be discharged from his obligation to perform the contract should
the goods be destroyed or should they become deteriorated. This is
one application of the rule that where specific goods are destroyed,
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without the fault of either party, prior to the time the risk of loss has
passed to the buyer, both parties are discharged under ordinary con-
tract principles of impossibility of performance.9
Since the section is aimed at risks of loss of identified goods, that is
to say of goods indicated in some way to be the goods sold, it is quite
clear that the section will not apply to the situation in which no par-
ticular goods are being dealt with. For example, in United Fig & Date
Co. v. Falkenberg,95 a buyer brought action against the seller for dam-
ages for breach of the contract, in that the seller tendered unmerchant-
able goods. The contract stated: "All sales of imported merchandise
are subject to its safe arrival at port of entry." In holding the seller
liable for damages for breach of contract, the court stated that there
was nothing to suggest that the particular goods tendered by the seller
to the buyer had been "sold" to the buyer or appropriated to the buyer
prior to the time they reached Seattle, the "port of entry." Had the in-
tention of the parties been that the particular goods sold were the spe-
cific goods covered by the clause, presumably the seller would have
been relieved of responsibility for deterioration en route, but under the
circumstances of the case, the seller's obligation to perform the con-
tract was not affected by the destruction of some goods not specifically
the subject matter of the sale. A similar result would follow under the
Code.9"
Section 2-325. "Letter of Credit" Term; "Confirmed Credit."
(1) Failure of the buyer seasonably to furnish an agreed letter of
credit is a breach of the contract for sale.
(2) The delivery to seller of a proper letter of credit suspends the
buyer's obligation to pay. If the letter of credit is dishonored,
the seller may on seasonable notification to the buyer require
payment directly from him.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed the term "letter of credit" or "banker's
credit" in a contract for sale means an irrevocable credit issued
by a financing agency of good repute and, where the shipment
is overseas, of good international repute. The term "confirmed
credit" means that the credit must also carry the direct obli-
gation of such an agency which does business in the seller's
financial market.
One of the main contributions of the Uniform Commercial Code is
94 See UxiFozm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-613; RCW 63.04.080, 63.04.090.
95 176 Wash. 122, 28 P.2d 287 (1934).
00 Official comment 2.
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the article therein dealing with letters of credit, the first effort at state
legislation in this field." The present section spells out the obligation
of the buyer under a contract calling for his furnishing a letter of
credit, using terms generally recognized in commerce. The detailed
statements of the nature of the letter of credit are without statutory
precedent and without judicial precedent in Washington; however, it
has been recognized that the buyer's failure to provide the letter of
credit called for by the contract is, unless waived, a breach of the
contract." This accords with the first subsection of this section.
Section 2-326. Sale on Approval and Sale or Return; Consign-
ment Sales and Rights of Creditors.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be returned
by the buyer even though they conform to the contract, the
transaction is
(a) a "sale on approval" if the goods are delivered primarily
for use, and
(b) a "sale or return" if the goods are delivered primarily for
resale.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), goods held on approval
are not subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until ac-
ceptance; goods held on sale or return are subject to such
claims while in the buyer's possession.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person
maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of the
kind involved, under a name other than the name of the person
making delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors of the
person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on
sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable
even though an agreement purports to reserve title to the per-
son making delivery until payment or resale or uses such words
as "on consignment" or "on memorandum." However, this sub-
97 Article 5.
98 In Bharat Overseas Ltd. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 685, 321 P.2d
266 (1958), the seller, as defendant, contended that the buyer's posting a letter of
credit was a condition precedent to the seller's duty to perform. The buyer had posted
a letter of credit, but the seller pointed to variances between the letter provided and
the one called for by the contract. In rejecting the seller's contention, the court held
that (a) the variance shown was immaterial, thus the buyer had substantially per-
formed, (b) further, the seller had waived the contract's specifications by accepting
the letter of credit sent without objection. In Anderson, Meyer & Co. v. Northwest
Trading Co., 115 Wash. 37, 196 Pac. 630 (1921), the contract called for payment of
"cash against shipping documents through confirmed bank credit," and the holding
seems to be that the buyer cannot recover, having failed to make the banking arrange-
ments, though the court seems to say that this failure was waived.
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section is not applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consign-
or's interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is gen-
erally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured
Transactions (Article 9).
(4) Any "or return" term of a contract for sale is to be treated as
a separate contract for sale within the statute of frauds section
of this Article (Section 2-201) and as contradicting the sale
aspect of the contract with in the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202).
The present statute9 recognizes the distinction between sales on
approval and sales on a "sale or return" basis, but it does not under-
take to spell out the factual differences between the two. Thus, sub-
section (1) of this section is without statutory precedent. Unless the
parties agree otherwise, the difference between the two transactions
turns on the idenity of the purchaser. If he is purchasing for
use or consumption and is given, in whatever terms, the power to
return conforming goods, the transaction is one on approval. On the
other hand, if the buyer is purchasing for resale, and thus not par-
ticularly interested in the way the article performs, the deal is a "sale
or return."' 99
The most frequent source of litigation in Washington in this area
has not involved the distinction between a sale or return and a sale
on approval, but has been the interpretation of contracts as either sales
or consignments.' The Code is not helpful in resolving these factual
99 RCW 63.04.200 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 19].
100 Though the Code is clear enough on this, the details can be seen in HAWKLAND,
SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) 88 and 101 (1958).
101 In Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G. P. -ialferty Co., 44 Wn.2d 646, 269
P.2d 806 (1954), the court in holding this transaction to be one of sale, stated that
the contract as written is not ambiguous, thus parol evidence is not admissible to show
that it was a consignment. Rathke v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Assn., 30 Wn.2d
486, 192 P.2d 349 (1948) (illegality under the Robinson Patman Act turned on whether
a transaction was a sale or brokerage agreement) ; Irwin v. Pacific Fruit & Produce
Co., 188 Wash. 572, 63 P.2d 382 (1936) (defendant not liable for the "price" where
he took on consignment and guaranteed a minimum return) ; Innocenti v. Padavich, 167
Wash. 515, 9 P.2d 1044 (1932) (risk of loss problem, loss not being caused by either
party, determined on the distinction between a sale and a consignment) ; Three Rivers
Growers' Assn v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 159 Wash. 572, 294 Pac. 233 (1930)
(Defendant's liability for the "price" turns on whether it purchased or took on con-
signment.) In Hansen Serv. Co. v. Lunn, 155 Wash. 182, 283 Pac. 695 (1930), the
distinction between a sale and a consignment arose collaterally. An uncompensated
surety had guaranteed that his son would pay the price of goods sold. It was held that
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disputes, except insofar as the parol evidence rule applies." 2 As be-
tween the seller and buyer, thus, no significant effect will be produced
by the Code.
However, the Code's treatment of the interests of creditors is dif-
ferent, for goods sold on sale or return are, under subsection (2) sub-
ject to claims of the buyer's creditors while the buyer is in possession.
Further, the entruster to a dealer of goods "on consignment" or "on
memorandum" is treated by subsection (3) as having delivered the
goods on sale or return, and thus the dealer's creditors have an in-
terest in those goods, unless the entruster complies with the filing pro-
visions in article 9, or shows that the dealer is generally known to be
operating as a factor in selling goods for others, or complies (in some
states) with a statute requiring posting of a sign.' The rights of pur-
chasers from one who has taken on approval or on sale or return will
be treated under section 2-403, by which the entruster in a variety of
situations loses his interests in the property when it reaches a bona
fide purchaser. 4
Section 2-327. Special Incidents of Sale on Approval and Sale or
Return.
he was not liable to the creditor who had delivered goods only on consignment. In
Hubenthal v. Creighton, 81 Wash. 688, 143 Pac. 98 (1914), there was a fatal variance
between the plaintiff's allegation of a sale and his proof of a contract of consignment.
In Kempe v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 154, 106 Pac. 619 (1910), a sale, not a consignment,
was found on these facts: (i) the agreement set a price which the defendant (buyer)
was to pay, without regard to what he was able to get on resale; (ii) the defendant
commingled the goods with the goods of several other persons with whom he had
similar arrangements; (iii) no books of account were kept as is required by what is
now RCW 20.01.370.
In McIntyre v. Johnston, 63 Wash. 323, 115 Pac. 509 (1911), are spelled out the
effects of a sale on approval and those of a sale or return. No principle different from
that stated in the Code is announced.
102 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202. See subsection (4) of the present section.
103 In Johnson-Stephens & Shinkle Shoe Co. v. Marlatt & Miller, 181 Wash. 621,
44 P.2d 818 (1935) the dispute was between a receiver and one who had entrusted
to the debtor either on consignment or on an unrecorded conditional sales contract.
The majority held that this was a conditional sale, not a consignment, but nonetheless
protected the entruster because it was effective, even though not recorded, as against
the receiver who did not represent subsequent creditors. The assumption is, of course,
that had this been a consignment, the entruster would be protected. The present section
of the Code, when read in connection with § 1-201 (12), would permit the receiver
to prevail over the consignor.
In Meyer v. Hodge, 91 Wash. 35, 157 Pac. 42 (1916), the buyer under a sale or
return arrangement had called a taxi late on a Saturday night, instructing the taxi
company to return the goods to the seller in Chicago. Before the goods could be turned
over to the railroad for re'.urn to Chicago, the buyer's creditors attached them. The
court treated this as a "resale" to the original seller, not complete before the creditors
had attached, and thus the seller was denied recovery against the sheriff who had
attached. One may ponder whether these goods were "within the buyer's possession,"
within the words of this section of the Code.
104 It has been held in Washington that one who entrusts to a dealer on consignment
may recover the goods from a purchaser to whom the dealer sold in an unordinary
way, such as a sale in payment of an antecedent debt, absent some estoppel against the
entruster. Eilers Music House v. Fairbanks, 80 Wash. 379, 141 Pac. 885 (1914), and
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(1) Under a sale on approval unless otherwise agreed
(a) although the goods are identified to the contract the risk
of loss and the title do not pass to the buyer until accept-
ance; and
(b) use of the goods consistent with the purpose of trial is not
acceptance but failure seasonably to notify the seller of
election to return the goods is acceptance, and if the goods
conform to the contract acceptance of any part is accept-
ance of the whole; and
(c) after due notification of election to return, the return is at
the seller's risk and expense but a merchant buyer must
follow any reasonable instructions.
(2) Under a sale or return unless otherwise agreed
(a) the option to return extends to the whole or any commer-
cial unit of the goods while in substantially their original
condition, but must be exercised seasonably; and
(b) the return is at the buyer's risk and expense.
The allocation of title and risk of loss in the sale on approval trans-
action, where the risk of loss is in the seller until the buyer has
accepted, and in the sale or return transaction, where the risk of loss
and title are in the buyer, is identical to that under the present statute
and decisions."0 5 Similarly, the policy expressed in subsection (1) (b)
by which the buyer's use and failure to notify the seller of dissatis-
faction amounts to acceptance echoes the decisions in this state."0
While in a sale on approval, if the buyer accepts any part he has,
under the Code, accepted all, there will be an occasional, rare instance
where the buyer may accept in part and reject the balance. In Berlin
Mack. Works v. Fuller,'07 the buyer purchased for one lump sum price
two saws, one of which was guaranteed by the seller to perform ac-
cording to certain specifications. The buyer used the otker saw-but
when the price was demanded, he contended that the guaranteed saw
did not meet the specifications. The contract was held to be severa-
the companion case of Eilers Music House v. Archer, 81 Wash. 698, 142 Pac. 453(1914).
1o5 RCW 63.04.200, Rule 3 [UNiFORm SALES AcT § 19, Rule 3], Tatum v. Geist,
46 Wash, 89 Pac. 547 (1907).
106 Aircraft Radio Ind. v. Palmer, 45 Wn.2d 737, 277 P.2d 737 (1954) (The buyer,
absent a specific time set by the contract, must act within a reasonable time) ; John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis Realty & Inv. Corp., 173 Wash. 444, 23 P.2d
572 (1933) ; Gruendler Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co. v. Preston Grain & Milling
Co. 124 Wash. 479, 215 Pac. 60 (1923) ; Richardton Roller Mills v. Miller, 99 Wash.
654, 170 Pac. 357 (1918).
107 59 Wash. 572, 110 Pac. 422 (1910).
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ble, in spite of the lump price, with the result that the seller recovered
the price of the saw used, but he could not recover for the other saw.
It would appear that the provision of the Code referring to acceptance
of any part as acceptance of all is predicated on a situation where all
are sold on approval. The basis for this rule is the assumed under-
standing of persons in a transaction of this sort, as distinguished from
a sale with option to return where the assumption is that the transferee
will sell the items one-by-one without, by any individual sale, accept-
ing the whole lot of the goods entrusted. °8 These rules are subject to
contrary agreement, so the housewife who takes home two dresses, in-
tending to select one, does not accept both by agreeing to purchase
the one she selects.109
The statute makes no provision with respect to whether the buyer,
in a sale on approval, must be personally satisfied or only reasonably
satisfied, since it requires only that he act in good faith."0
Section 2-328. Sale by Auction.
(1) In a sale by auction if the goods are put up in lots each lot is
the subject of a separate sale.
(2) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces
by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner. Where
a bid is made while the hammer is falling in acceptance of a
prior bid the auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bid-
ding or declare the goods sold under the bid on which the
hammer was falling.
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit terms
put up without reserve. In an auction with reserve the auc-
tioneer may withdraw the goods at any time until he announces
completion of the sale. In an auction without reserve, after the
auctioneer calls for bids on an article or lot, that article or lot
cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is made within a reasona-
ble time. In either case a bidder may retract his bid until the
auctioneer's announcement of completion of the sale, but a bid-
der's retraction does not revive any previous bid.
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's be-
half or the seller makes or procures such a bid, and notice has
not been given that liberty for such bidding is reserved, the
buyer may at his option avoid the sale or take the goods at
108 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM! COMMERCIAL CODE)
103 (1958).
109 Official comment 1.
110 HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 108; see Tatum v. Geist, suepra note 105.
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the price of the last good faith bid prior to the completion of
the sale. This subsection shall not apply to any bid at a forced
sale.
No Washington decisions have been found dealing with the Uniform
Sales Act counterpart of this section,"' or with the common law rules
pertaining to auctions."2 The recent decision in Continental Can Co.
v. Commercial Waterway Dist.,"3 merits a comparison with the Code
provision. In that case, certain real estate owned by the district was
put up for sale at auction, on the announced terms that: "The com-
missioners reserve the right to reject any and all bids received...."
The plaintiff in the action was the highest bidder to whom the auc-
tioneer had "knocked down" the property, but the district commission-
ers rejected its bid. The action was one to compel the commissioners
to issue a deed, and the determinative issue was the effect of this reser-
vation of the right in the commissioners to reject bids, which the court
interpreted as authorizing such rejection even after' the hammer had
fallen. Conceptually, the issue would seem to be whether an accepted
bid is still a bid within the meaning of the rule.
Under the Code (though obviously it would not affect the sale in-
volved in the discussed case for a variety of reasons) a similar result
would not be expected, for the Code suggests that the sale is complete
when the auctioneer announces his acceptance of the high bid in any
usual manner. The bid, now an accepted offer, would seem no longer
to be subject to retraction or rejection."4
Section 2-401. Passing of Title; Reservation for Security; Limited
Application of This Section.
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obliga-
tions and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other
third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except
where the provision refers to such title. Insofar as situations are
not covered by the other provisions of this Article and matters
concerning title become material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to
their identification to the contract (Section 2-501), and unless
otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their identi-
fication a special property as limited by this Act. Any reten-
I' RCW 63.04.220 [UNIFORM SALES AcT S21].
112 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 27 (1933).
"is 155 Wash. Dec. 313, 347 P.2d 887 (1959).
14 Collins v. Heitman, 225 Ark. 666, 284 S.W.2d 628 (1955).
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tion or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a res-
ervation of a security interest. Subject to these provisions and
to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Arti-
cle 9), title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any
manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the
parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at
the time and place at which the seller completes his perform-
ance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, de-
spite any reservation of a security interest and even though a
document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place;
and in particular and despite any reservation of a security in-
terest by the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the
goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver
them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time
and place of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes
on tender there.
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be made
without moving the goods,
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title passes at
the time when and the place where he delivers such docu-
ments; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identi-
fied and no documents are to be delivered, title passes at
the time and place of contracting.
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain
the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of
acceptance revests title to the goods in the seller. Such revest-
ing occurs by operation of law and is not a "sale."
The opening paragraph of this section is perhaps the most signifi-
cant contribution of article II of the Code, for it marks a departure
from the current approach of solving a wide variety of disputes in sales
transactions by first resolving the question, "who has title?" Each of
the following questions is typically solved today by determination of
which of the parties has the title to the goods:
(1) Who has the risk of loss?"..
115 For example, in Innocenti v. Padavich, 167 Wash. 515, 9 P.2d 1094 (1932), the
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(2) Why may insure the goods?116
(3) When may the seller sue for the price?1.
(4) Who may sue a third person who damages the goods?..8
(5) What is the relative position of each party to the sale with re-
spect to the other party's creditors?".9
(6) What is the effect of use of terms such as F.O.B., C.I.F., and
C. & F.? 20
Each of these is specifically covered by the Code.
Before one can decide an issue in a particular case on the basis of
the present section, dealing with title, one must be absolutely certain
that that particular issue is not specifically covered elsewhere. This is
the last place to look; not, as under the present statute, the first.' -
This leaves the attorney with a somewhat uncertain feeling until he
finds the specific answer to his client's question somewhere in the
Code, a not unusual response. As the Code becomes more familiar and
better indexed, this approach will be less awesome.
There will, of course, be cases which must be resolved on the basis
of the location of the title, 22 and the presently discussed section is the
court says: "The question is whether the loss by reason of the collision should fall
upon the appellant or upon the respondents, and this in turn depends upon where the
title was." In Lauber v. Johnston, 54 Wash. 59, 102 Pac. 873 (1909) risk of the loss
of hay destroyed by fire was determined by the allocation of the title. Under the Code,
the technique is to ask, "who bears the'risk of loss ?" and the answer is to be found
in §§ 2-509 and 2-510.
'116 This is spelled out in § 2-501.
"17 Under the present statute, RCW 63.04.640 [UminoRM SALES AcT § 63] this is
determined by whether "property" or the title to the goods has passed to the buyer.
Under the Code, § 2-709, the circumstances in which the price is recoverable are
spelled out without reference to title.
I's This will turn on who is the real party in interest, typically decided on the basis
of who is the owner or who has title, as in Sweeney v. Waterhouse & Co., 39 Wash.
507, 81 Pac. 1005 (1905). Under the Code, this matter is specifically dealt with by
§ 2-722.
119 In Lloyd L. Hughes, Inc. v. Widders, 187 Wash. 452, 60 P.2d 243 (1936) the
location of title in a sales transaction determined whether the goods were subject to
attachment by a creditor of the seller. Under the Code, there are specific sections
dealing with (a) the rights of creditors of the seller vis a vis the buyer (§§ 2-402,
2-501) ; (b) the buyer's rights to goods on the seller's insolvency (§ 2-502), and (c)
the seller's rights to reclaim on discovery of the buyer's insolvency (§ 2-702).
120 Under the present statute (RCW 63.04.200) these terms are usually construed
with respect to the effect they have on the passage of title, usually involving the extent
to which they require the seller to deliver to the buyer or the extent to which they
show an avowal by the buyer of some interest in the goods, as by his contract requir-
ing insurance thereon. Under the Code, as has been seen, each of the various well-
known commercial terms is specifically treated. (Q§ 2-319 through 2-324).
121 Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 3, 26
(1951)
'122 In State v. Hartwig, 45 Wn.2d 76, 273 P.2d 482 (1954), the issue was the mean-
ing the word -"sell" in a criminal statute making the sale of mortgaged goods without
revealing the existence of the mortgage a false representation under the larceny stat-
ute. (RCW 9.54.070) The buyer had paid $100 "e arnest money" under the agreement
that "title!' would remain in the seller until the balance of the price was paid. The
court pointed out that "sell" means completed sales where title has passed, so the
19601
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
"catch all" to provide the solution. By making quite clear that the
seller's reservation of "title" is a reservation of a security interest
only, it clarifies the existing Washington law."2 3
With respect to the criteria for determining whether the title has
passed, the Code (although allowing free range to the parties to con-
tract with respect thereto) 12 makes the matter turn on objectively
manifested circumstances- delivery. This does not mean that in all
cases a physical handing over to the buyer will be required, for this
section articulates the types of situations where (a) the seller may be
required to deliver at destination of a shipment, (b) the seller may be
required to send the goods, but does not have to deliver them, or (c)
the seller may not have to move the goods at all. In all of these situa-
tions, the seller must commit himself to specific goods as covered by
the sale, and this is the critical factor. That manifestation of commit-
ment is found on his completion of the steps necessary for his delivery
of specific goods. In the case of the present sale of identified goods
not to be moved, the very making of the contract of sale is sufficient
to manifest the seller's commitment. 5
Section 2-402. Rights of Seller's Creditors Against Sold Goods.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of un-
secured creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have
been identified to a contract for sale are subject to the buyer's
rights to recover the goods under this Article (Sections 2-502
and 2-716).
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of
goods to a contract for sale as void if as against him a reten-
tion of possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of
law of the state where the goods are situated, except that re-
statute is not relevant to this case. Under the Code, if the court elects to find its defi-
nition of sell or sale under this Article, one would find this definition in § 2-106: "A
'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (§ 2-401)."
Thus the crux remains the title to the goods, but the Code makes it quite plain that
the reservation of "title" by a seller until he is paid means only that he has retained
a security interest in the goods. One may doubt, however, whether a criminal convic-
tion would follow from use of this statute, particularly where it appears that the
seller-defendant was able to and showed clearly his intention to make the title good
on completion of the instalment payments.
In Mayer v. Gibson, 114 Wash. 394, 195 Pac. 1 (1921) the obviously to be antici-
pated problem of the incidence of a property tax on goods turned on the location of
the title, a solution still available by use of this section of the Code.
123 In Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925) the risk of
loss in a conditional sale contract was held to be on the seller because he had reserved
"title." See Shattuck, Secured Transactions Under the UCC, 29 WASH. L. REV.
1, 39 (1954).
124 Except that title cannot pass to goods not in existence.
125 Official comment 4.
[VOL. 35
SALES AND THE U.C.C.
tention of possession in good faith and current course of trade
by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after
a sale or identification is not fraudulent.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of
creditors of the seller
(a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9); or
(b) where identification to the contract or delivery is made not
in current course of trade but in satisfaction of or as secur-
ity for a pre-existing claim for money, security or the like
and is made under circumstances which under any rule of
law of the state where the goods are situated would apart
from this Article constitute the transaction a fraudulent
transfer or voidable preference.
Subsection (1) is designed to clarify the point that the rights of un-
secured creditors of the seller will be subject to*the buyer's rights not
on the basis of finding that "title" has passed, but on the circumstance
that the particular goods have been identified to the contract, a matter
best discussed in connection with sections 2-502 and 2-716, referred
to in this subsection.128
Subsection (2) is the counterpart of the present provision in the
Uniform Sales Act..2 7 To be remembered is that there is an additional
statute as follows:
No bill of sale for the transfer of personal property shall be valid,
as against existing creditors, or innocent purchasers where the prop-
ertyis left in the possession of the vendor, unless the said bill of sale
be recorded in the auditor's office of the county in which the property
is situated, within ten days after such sale shall be made.12
That statute will supplement the Code's provisions as to those persons
who were creditors at the time of the sale.'29
3.26 This provision of the Code wvill not change existing Washington law. In Huseby
v. Kilgore, 32 Wn.2d 179, 201 P.2d 148 (1948) a dispute between a buyer and creditors
of the seller was resolved in the buyer's favor where the buyer bad paid and the goods
had been identified to the contract.
127 RCW 63.04.270 [UNrFoRm SALEs Acr §26].
128 RCW 65.08.040.
129 The statute is in terms limited to'protection of existing creditors. Crutcher v.
Scott Pub. Co., 42 Wn.2d 89, 253 P.2d 925 (1953) ; Greenwood v. Corbin, 48' Wash.
357, 93 Pac. 433 (1908). Under this statute, a change of possession is required, unless
the bill of sale is properly recorded. Houghland v. Wolfe, 122 Wash. 473, 210'Pac.
805 (1922) ; Schloss v. Stringer, 113 Wash. 529, 194 Pac. 577 (1920) ; Rowan v. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 105 Wash.-432, 178 Pac. 473 (1919); Churchill v. Miller, 90 Wash.
694, 156 Pac. 851 (1916).
1960]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Subsection (3) makes it quite clear that those statutes dealing with
preferences 3 ' and fraudulent conveyances..' are not affected.
Section 2-403. Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchases of Goods;
"Entrusting."
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had
or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited
interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest pur-
chased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods
have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the pur-
chaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the pur-
chaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale,"
or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of
the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in re-
tention of possession regardless of any condition expressed be-
tween the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regard-
less of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the
possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are
governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9),
Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).
Subsection (1) continues the prevailing rule that a purchaser in
good faith and for value from one having a voidable title takes free
of the claim of the person having the power to avoid that title.'32 It
also continues the general principles of agency and estoppel, in that
3ao RCW ch. 23.72.
13' RCW ch. 19.40.
132 RCW 63.04.250 [UNIFORM SALES AcTr §24] ; Fisher v. Thumlert, 194 Wash. 70,
76 P.2d 1018 (1938) ; Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Schreiber, 29 Wash. 94, 69 Pac. 648
(1902).
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the purchaser of goods acquires the title which the transferor "had
power" to transfer, and this power can be given by express agency,
by apparent authority, or by estoppel.8 ' It then deals in detail with
four types of sales transactions where the purchaser is held to have
the power to transfer title to a bona fide purchaser for value, even
though the purchaser's title vis-h-vis the initial seller is defective.
Subsections (b) and (c), dealing with sales induced by the use of
bogus checks and the related "cash sale" transaction will change the
Washington law. 8"
Subdivision 1(a) and l(d) are diametrically contrary to another
section, of the Revised Code of Washington, as it is presently con-
strued. That section provides:
All property obtained by larceny, robbery or burglary, shall be re-
stored to the owner; and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of
the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his rights to such prop-
erty; and it shall be the duty of the officer who shall arrest any person
charged as principal or accessory in any robbery or larceny, to secure-
the property alleged to have been stolen, and he shall be answerable
for the same, and shall annex a schedule thereof to" his return of the
warrant.'15
Insofar as larceny includes obtaining property by false pretenses the
Code will protect bona fide purchasers, but the above section has been
construed as protecting the original owner."3 6 If the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is adopted, RCW 10.79.050 should be repealed in its
present form. If it is not repealed, the primacy of the Code should be
protected by finding a constructive repeal of the older inconsistent
statute, or by construing the statute as merely one directing the ar-
resting officer as to the proper immediate disposition of stolen 'goods,
1 383Brod v. Gehri Heating & Plumbing Co., 200 Wash. 80, 93 P.2d 313 (1939);
Schoenfelds Standard Furniture Co. v. Stoe, 175 Wash. 201, 27 P.2d 564 (1933);
Eatonville State Bank v. Marshall, 170 Wash. 503, 17 P.2d 14 (1932); Gramm-Bern-
stein Motor Truck Co. v. Todd, 121 Wash. 145, 209 Pac. 3 (1922).
'54 Quality Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber & Shingle Co., 110 Wash. 60, 187
Pac. 705 (1920) ; Orilla Lumber Co. v. Milwaukee & P. S. Ry. Co., 81* Wash. 611,
143 Pac. 152 (1914), rev'd 84 Wash. 362, 148 Pac. 850 (1915), (on principles of estop-
pel). Because of the hardship imposed by the presently prevailing legal principle, the
courts tend to find exceptions, as in the Orilla Lumber Co. case, rzpra, on rehearing,
and as in Esmond v. Richards, 112 Wash. 641, 192 Pac. 917 (1920), where a sale on
credit rather than for cash was found. See also Goodwin v. Bear, 122 Wash. 49, 209
Pac. 1080 (1922). The issue does not arise where the original owner does not volun-
tarily part with possession. Turner v. Benz Bros. & Co., 153 Wash. 123, 279 Pac. 398
(1929) ; Merinella v. Swartz, 123 Wash. 521, 212 Pac. 1052 (1923).
135 RCW 10.79.050.
136 Richardson v. Seattle First Nat! Bank, 38 Wn.2d 314, 229 P2d 341 (1951),
overruling Hutson v. Walker, 37 Wn.2d 12, 221 P.2d 506 (1950); Frye & Co. v.
Boltman, 182 Wash. 447, 47 P.2d 839 (1935) ; Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac.
13 (1921).
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or by construing the statute to mean larceny as it existed at the time
RCW 10.79.050's counterpart in earlier codes was adopted, that is, as
not including false pretense.'
Subsection (2) is in effect an adoption of the rule of market overt,
for any entrusting of goods for whatever purpose to a dealer gives the
dealer power to transfer the property so entrusted to a buyer in ordi-
nary course of business. Though this comports with a dictum in a
Washington decision,'38 it is a substantial change from the generally
accepted rule. 9
Subsection (3) runs counter to the statute dealing with stolen goods,
previously discussed, and so far as it relates to the retention of pos-
session by the seller must be read in connection with the bill of sale
recording statute.4 Though the former of these statutes may be re-
pealed by implication by adoption of this section of the Code, it is not
likely that the bills of sale recording provision will be so dealt with.14'
This section of the Code protects only buyers in the ordinary course
of business, leaving to article 9 the rights of others. 4 '
[This discussion will be continued in subsequent issues.]
17 See Linn v. Reid, supra note 136.
138 Bauer v. Commercial Credit Co., 163 Wash. 210, 300 Pac. 1049 (1931).
139 VOLD, SALES 390 (2d. ed., 1959).
140 RCW 65.08.040.
141 Professor Williston was of the opinion that the adoption of the Uniform Sales
Act's § 25 would repeal this statute. Ayer, The Uniform Sales Act in the State of
Washington, 2 WASH. L. REv. 65, 166 (1927). This has not proved to be the case.
Differences in construction of the Code and the Bills of Sale Recording Statute
may be expected, such as the interpretation of who is a "buyer," as in Champagne v.
Birnot, 143 Wash. 187, 254 Pac. 829 (1927) protecting an innocent mortgagee.
142 The entrusting of goods to a dealer by a seller who takes from that dealer a
conditional sales contract will enable that dealer to sell to a purchaser under doctrines
of actual authority to sell. Not infrequently, however, the rights of conditional sellers
will be determined by the applicable recording statutes. See Commercial Credit Co. v.
Cutler, 176 Wash. 423, 29 P.2d 686 (1934); Bauer v. Commercial Credit Co. supra
note 138; Northwestern Fin. Co. v. Russell, 161 Wash. 389, 297 Pac. 186 (1931)
Bonneviere v. Cole, 90 Wash. 526, 156 Pac. 527 (1916).
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